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CRIMINAL (IN)JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
Stephanos Bibas∗ 
Professor Nicola Lacey wishes I had written a different kind of 
book.  True, she graciously praises my careful institutional analyses of 
plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion, my emphasis on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system, my concern for re-
specting victims’ and defendants’ humanity, and my detailed sugges-
tions for reform.1  But she objects that my book is not comparative, 
even though I disclaim that ambition precisely because America’s dis-
tinctive criminal justice history and responsive political economy (in-
cluding initiatives, referenda, and traditions of lay jury service) set it 
apart from Europe.2  She faults me for offering a primarily internal 
critique “relentless[ly] focus[ed] on a particular cluster of criminal jus-
tice–specific variables”3 instead of ranging through social science liter-
ature to paint an external, broad-brush picture of “power relations and 
broad institutional dynamics”4 such as slavery, Jim Crow laws, welfare 
policy, and the “catastrophic collapse of Fordist industrial produc-
tion.”5  She misdescribes my book as embracing an “apocalyptic vision 
of professionalization” and “contempt for expertise,”6 though I advo-
cate having experts and laymen check and balance one another as part 
of a broad conversation.7  And, in critiquing a book built on hundreds 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank the 
editors of the Harvard Law Review for the opportunity to engage in this dialogue and for their 
helpful suggestions and Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Richard A. Bierschbach for their advice 
and comments on an earlier draft. 
 1 See Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice or 
Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1308, 1324 (2013) (reviewing STEPHANOS  
BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012)). 
 2 Compare id. at 1311 (“There is only brief comparative analysis of the difference between the 
American and other contemporary criminal justice systems . . . .”), with BIBAS, supra note 1,  
at 1–2, 40, 122–23 (“Descriptively, America is not Europe. . . . Popular pressure is a fact of life in 
America, and criminal justice ignores it at its peril.”). 
 3 See Lacey, supra note 1, at 1311. 
 4 Id. at 1300. 
 5 Id. at 1319. 
 6 Id. at 1324.  Note also the hyperbolic comparison of my proposals to “Frankenstein’s Mon-
ster?” in her title.  Id. at 1299. 
 7 As Professor Ronald Wright accurately puts it: “Bibas is not a Luddite, determined to smash 
the machine.”  Ronald Wright, Review of The Machinery of Criminal Justice, CRIM. L. & 
CRIM. JUST. BOOKS (Sept. 2012), http://clcjbooks.rutgers.edu/books/machinery_of_criminal 
_justice.html.  Rather, I seek to adjust “[t]he optimal blend of technical expertise and popular val-
ues.”  Id.  Another reviewer, Professor Michael O’Hear, sees the fruit of focusing on the legal sys-
tem as one of interplay and conversation: “Professor Bibas’s encompassing, system-wide perspec-
tive is a particularly helpful contribution,” as the book is “consistently insightful as to the subtle 
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of authorities and criminal justice episodes, Lacey cites and discusses 
secondary academic sources but not a single case, a single procedural 
rule, a single news report, or a single statistical compilation, and men-
tions only a single statute in passing.8   
A reader of Lacey’s review would barely glimpse two of the three 
main pillars on which the book rests: retail justice and agency costs.  
These two pillars, along with democracy, undergird my analyses of ret-
ribution and emotion.  I address each of these arguments below. 
I.  WHOLESALE VERSUS RETAIL JUSTICE 
Lacey assumes that involving the public in shaping criminal justice 
ineluctably leads to knee-jerk punitiveness.  She entirely overlooks the 
book’s fundamental distinction between making criminal justice policy 
wholesale and adjudicating deserved punishment at the retail level, in 
individual cases.9  Wholesale policies are tainted by the media’s sensa-
tionalistic stories, co-opted by politicians, and clouded by cartoonish 
stereotypes of feared predators.  That is especially true when they are 
adopted at high levels of government, as discussed below. 
Retail justice, as applied by juries and the like, involves setting 
aside stereotypes to consider flesh-and-blood victims and defendants in 
all their complexity.  Professor Paul Robinson and his coauthors have 
found strong empirical evidence that lay punishment judgments about 
detailed cases are extremely consistent, nuanced, and sensitive to the 
facts.10  The same is not true of abstract hypotheticals, which leave 
voters free to fill in the blanks with stereotypes and fears.11 
Nevertheless, Lacey seems to call for more rules and claims that I 
want to get rid of “general regulative rules” entirely.12  That character-
ization is untrue.  I advocate publication of policing, charging, plea-
bargaining, and sentencing policies, which should incorporate public 
input.13  And I favor both statutory maximum sentences and advisory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
interactions” among “substantive criminal law, . . . criminal procedure, . . . sentencing, 
. . . corrections, [and] clemency.”  Michael M. O’Hear, (The History of) Criminal Justice as a Mo-
rality Play, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 132, 137 (2013) (book review), http://www 
.pennumbra.com/essays/01-2013/OHear.pdf.  For a third review that likewise does not share  
Lacey’s reading of the book, see Andrew Taslitz, Tinkering with the Machinery of Justice,  
JOTWELL: CRIM. L. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://crim.jotwell.com/tinkering-with-the-machinery-of-
justice/. 
 8 See Lacey, supra note 1, at 1301 n.9. 
 9 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at xxi, 35–38, 119, 123. 
 10 Id. at 119 (citing Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intui-
tions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1867–73, 1883–87 (2007)). 
 11 Id. at 36. 
 12 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 13 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 145–46. 
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sentencing guidelines with presumptive plea discounts, subject to jury 
adjustment.14 
I do, however, seek to unlock mandatory minimum penalties and 
loosen the federal Sentencing Guidelines, so that prosecutors must jus-
tify their sentences to juries instead of dictating them unilaterally.  
Does Lacey mean to defend mandatory minimum sentencing and the 
gobbledygook of mathematical guidelines on the theory that if some 
rules are good then more must be better?  Does she like letting prose-
cutors unilaterally set sentences by charge bargaining under binding 
sentencing guidelines?  Her position seems to imply her embrace of 
those widely condemned policies.  But because she cannot conceive of 
how retail or lower-level justice might be different, she suggests no al-
ternative. 
II.  DEMOCRACY, LOCALISM, AND EQUALITY 
My book advocates placing more faith in voters, the political 
branches, and decisionmaking at lower levels of government.  Lacey 
disagrees on all counts, proudly identifying herself as one of “the ‘Brit-
ish liberal elites’ who ‘fear untutored public sentiment’ and emo-
tion.”15  She undervalues America’s deep commitments to federalism, 
localism, and democratic self-government and overlooks the related 
problem of agency costs. 
A.  Electoral Democracy and Agency Costs 
Lacey entirely ignores my bedrock concern for political theory, re-
ducing my commitment to democracy to a matter of “perceived legiti-
macy.”16  As the Declaration of Independence put it, America is found-
ed on the idea that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”17  While officials may filter momentary pas-
sions, they act illegitimately if they slight or distort the public’s long-
term desires for procedural and substantive justice.18  She is so thor-
oughly Weberian that she cannot address my Tocquevillean arguments 
for democratic self-government.19 
Lacey thus wants to redouble our efforts to insulate criminal justice 
policy from politics.  She joins the conventional wisdom in “a decisive-
ly one-sided debate” that is “distrustful of the crowd” and blames crim-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 Id. at 158–59. 
 15 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1311 (quoting BIBAS, supra note 1, at 122). 
 16 Id. at 1308. 
 17 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 18 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 126. 
 19 Cf. id. at xxx (comparing my Tocquevillean approach with the Weberian approach of crimi-
nal justice insiders). 
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inal justice’s pathologies entirely on the benighted public.20  That leads 
her to the “expert consensus” in favor of “insulat[ing] crime policy from 
crime politics.”21 
That strategy has failed.22  At the root of the problem are agency 
costs, a term that Lacey uses only once though the concept undergirds 
my book.23  As the book argues at length, criminal justice insiders 
have sought to serve their self-interests and squelch outsider (lay) par-
ticipation.  But the result has been a pathological tug-of-war, pitting 
outsiders against insiders instead of trying to accommodate them con-
structively.24  As Professor Rachel Barkow has shown, the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission failed in significant part because it sought to be a 
secretive, insular, expert agency divorced from politics.  Thus, particu-
larly when the Commission has sought to act independently, Congress 
has taken to disregarding and superseding its recommendations.25  By 
contrast, state sentencing commissions have fared far better by being 
more transparent and participatory.  They comprise a wide range of 
stakeholders and often include politically connected figures, so they 
foster informed dialogue among a range of expert and lay participants.26 
Lacey never reflects on the repeated failure of her preferred strate-
gy.  Nor does she acknowledge the need for structural checks and bal-
ances, including fresh perspectives, to rein in unchecked insider discre-
tion and agency costs.  Our political economy is too populist and 
responsive to let criminal justice policy deviate in the long term from 
the public’s sense of justice.27  If we do not include outsiders construc-
tively, they will force their way in destructively, through initiatives, 
referenda, legislation, and the like.  That is how we wound up with 
California’s draconian, overbroad three-strikes law, for example.28 
Instead of engaging with America’s political tradition, Lacey over-
simplifies the problem to “(loosely speaking) a ‘prisoners’ dilemma,’” 
repeatedly using that term to describe any time electoral competition 
results in suboptimal criminal justice policy.29  Lacey’s misuse of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Wright, supra note 7. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1303; cf. id. at 1301, 1303, 1305, 1307 (referring in passing to agents’ 
self-interests without specifically invoking agency costs). 
 24 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 32–33, 40–53. 
 25 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 768–71, 799 (2005). 
 26 See id. at 771–812. 
 27 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 40. 
 28 Id. at 45–46. 
 29 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1300; see id. at 1319, 1320, 1321.  Her misuse of the language is espe-
cially striking given that Lacey has misused the term “prisoners’ dilemma” to the same effect in 
the title of one of her books and the title one of her articles.  See NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISON-
ERS’ DILEMMA (2008); Nicola Lacey, Political Systems and Criminal Justice: The Prisoners’ Di-
lemma After the Coalition, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 203 (2012).  
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term inadvertently implies that there is a single high-punishment equi-
librium that one can logically abstract from culture, history, and other 
factors that shape legal and political coordination.30 
B.  Localism 
Lacey puts her trust in higher levels of government, further re-
moved from the demos.  Hasn’t she heard the deafening outcry against 
the over-federalization of crime and steep federal sentences?  It is fed-
eral criminal justice that continues to showcase draconian drug sen-
tences and mandatory minimum penalties.  Because prisons are only a 
drop in the ocean of the federal budget, there is little fiscal pushback. 
By contrast, corrections expenses typically make up at least the 
fourth-largest share of states’ budgets, giving states better incentives to 
attend to both the costs and benefits of carceral policies.31  That is 
why many states, but not the federal government, are starting to lower 
sentences and release nonviolent prisoners: they must trade off the 
benefits of incarceration against the costs of closing hospitals and 
schools or raising taxes through the roof.  The same is true of counties 
and cities that must fund police, prosecutors, courts, and jails.  Lacey 
is right to imply that counties and cities can externalize some costs of 
their penal policies by relying on state prisons.32  But the solution is to 
align budgets and priorities through more consistent local funding or 
rationing, not to make matters worse by federalizing everything. 
Lacey asserts that I do not discuss realistically how to balance costs 
and justice because she expects a top-down scientific metric, not a pro-
cess.33  She does not trust local democratic deliberation to weigh costs 
and benefits in light of fiscal constraints.  She never addresses my pro-
posals for greater reliance on community policing and community 
prosecution, for example, to set enforcement priorities and policies.34  
Instead of proposing a sweeping, abstract policy such as drug decrimi-
nalization, I trust neighborhood-level deliberation to weigh the costs 
and benefits of low-level drug enforcement.  As a result, police and 
prosecutors might emphasize shutting down dangerous crack houses 
more than targeting discreet sales in private.35  Police and prosecutors 
might also shift resources away from racking up easy arrest statistics 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, 
and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 213 (2009) (also noting that legal scholars overuse the term pris-
oners’ dilemma, the only game they know, as a shorthand for a variety of other cooperation and 
coordination games). 
 31 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1276, 1290 & n.70 (2005). 
 32 See Lacey, supra note 1, at 1320. 
 33 See id. at 1314–15. 
 34 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 146–48. 
 35 Id. at 147, 153. 
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in vice cases and toward the violent and property crimes that may 
worry local residents more.36 
C.  Equality 
Lacey’s top-down approach colors her view of how to pursue 
equality.  She does not appear to see the differences between formal 
and substantive equality.  Federal, top-down rules of the sort she fa-
vors, such as mandatory minimum sentences, treat unlike cases alike, 
inflicting ten-year sentences on both substantial drug distributors and 
minor dealers selling to support their own habits.  And this rule-bound 
approach does not even guarantee equal treatment for similarly  
situated defendants, as prosecutors routinely bargain away so-called 
mandatory penalties for defendants who have experienced counsel or 
agree to cooperate.37  As the late Bill Stuntz noted, even when it ap-
pears to be rule-like, “criminal law does not function as law.  Rather, 
the law defines a menu of options for police officers and prosecutors to 
use as they see fit.”38  Lacey fails to address the yawning chasm be-
tween the rules she favors on paper and how insiders manipulate those 
rules in practice. 
Substantive equality requires starting with rules and benchmarks, 
to be sure, but also leaving room to tailor sentences to particular facts 
and equities, to discern which cases are truly alike.  Far from promot-
ing economic equality, as Lacey suggests, the status quo’s low-visibility 
discretion favors the rich and well-connected.  They can afford expen-
sive lawyers, game the system, and exercise influence behind the 
scenes.  Racial equality is better served at lower levels, where particu-
lar neighborhoods have a say in balancing the harms they suffer from 
crime against the costs of overly aggressive enforcement.  Empowering 
these neighborhoods through community policing and prosecution and 
restorative sentencing juries can, as Professor Michael O’Hear 
acknowledges, “help soften the racial tensions associated with our 
criminal justice system.”39 
My book further takes on the conventional wisdom that trusts 
judges, and not elected officials, to pursue racial and economic equali-
ty.  Over the past half-century, the Supreme Court’s active role in 
criminal procedure has done little to reduce racial disparities, which 
continue to plague criminal justice.  In several specific areas, courts 
have failed while legislatures and executives have recently succeeded: 
While courts have been ineffectual at tackling race disparities and in-
nocence problems in capital punishment, state legislatures and execu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 Id. at xxvii, 147. 
 37 Id. at 44–48. 
 38 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (2011). 
 39 O’Hear, supra note 7, at 147. 
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tives in Illinois, Maryland, and elsewhere have imposed moratoria, es-
tablished study commissions, commuted some sentences, and even re-
pealed the death penalty.  While courts have done nothing to stop po-
lice from pulling over motorists for “Driving While Black,” New 
Jersey’s executive and legislature have tackled the problem head-on.  
And while courts have allowed penalties for (mostly black) crack-
cocaine defendants to exceed greatly those for (whiter) powder-cocaine 
defendants, the President and Congress have at last lowered crack  
penalties on their own.40 
Lacey rejects reliance on the political branches but cites no contra-
ry evidence apart from a passing reference to the War on Drugs,41 even 
though both the reduction of crack-cocaine disparities and the recent 
legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington may belie her 
assertion.  Today, many minorities wield political power, particularly at 
the local and neighborhood levels, and I advocate devolving more po-
litical power to those lower levels.  Thus, as Professors Dan Kahan 
and Tracey Meares have argued, courts should not continue to hobble 
law enforcement in the name of racial equality.  They should instead 
promote cooperation between police and minority groups, who want 
measured help in cleaning up their own neighborhoods.42  Localism, 
democracy, and equality can thus go hand in hand. 
III.  POPULAR JUSTICE, EMOTION, AND RETRIBUTION 
Local democracy and retail justice are sensitive to lay moral and 
retributive judgments.  But professionalization generates agency costs, 
leaving insiders free to slight these needs.  Lacey applauds this state of 
affairs because she denigrates the legitimate roles of emotion and  
retribution. 
A.  Emotion 
Lacey seems to believe that whatever the problems of experts, they 
remain the bulwarks of reason in a system otherwise susceptible to the 
mob’s emotions.  Because I seek constructive, democratic outlets for 
retributive emotions, she mistakenly objects that I “dismiss the im-
portance of rational argumentation and general rules.”43  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 92, 125–26, 163–64, 220 n.19. 
 41 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1309–10. 
 42 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1179 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquat-
ed Procedural Thinking: A Critique of City of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 
208. 
 43 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1316; see also id. at 1306 (suggesting that I pit “emotion” against “ra-
tional argumentation and the focus on the efficient pursuit of system goals”). 
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But Lacey buys into the false dichotomy between reason and emo-
tion, oversimplifying the latter to raw “anger, hatred, and disgust.”44  
As Aristotle maintained, emotion is in part cognitive; we can reflect 
upon, evaluate, and educate our emotions.45  Reason and emotion must 
converse constructively about appropriate empathy, for instance, or 
how to progress from blame through shame to remorse and for-
giveness.  (Forgiveness and mercy are among the many themes of the 
book that Lacey slights.)  Humans are not Vulcans.  When academics 
and lawyers ignore outsiders’ emotional needs, outsiders chafe and are 
tempted to rebel. 
B.  Retribution 
Lacey is similarly uncharitable toward retribution.  She collapses 
retribution into vengeance, in part because she cannot see retribution’s 
cognitive, evaluative component.46  The former is a reflective, impar-
tial, proportional moral judgment, while the latter is a hot, unchecked 
passion.47  She also blames retribution for America’s pathological pe-
nal policies.  But three-strikes laws and mandatory minima diverge 
wildly from the public’s sense of retribution in many instances.48   
They are better understood as wholesale incapacitative measures that 
result from outsiders’ tug-of-war with insiders, in part because outsid-
ers are misled by politicians and the media and misunderstand average 
penalties.49 
Indeed, it is retribution’s concern for proportional punishment, and 
for treating defendants as our fellow humans rather than as wild 
beasts to be caged, that leads me to share Lacey’s “fears about the 
long-term stigmatizing and degrading effects of punishment.”50  That 
is why I devote so much attention to educating, training, and employ-
ing prisoners and to promoting prisoner reentry.51 
Lacey insists that victims crave vengeance and punishment, which 
“may lead to vigilantism and rampant inequality.”52  But she fails to 
grapple with the empirical evidence that average victims, like average 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Id. at 1317. 
 45 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 88, 218 n.12.  The cited passages follow Kahan, Nussbaum, and 
Pillsbury, who in turn follow Aristotle. 
 46 See Lacey, supra note 1, at 1315–16. 
 47 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366–68 (1981). 
 48 See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1975–78 
(2010) (summarizing previous empirical studies finding divergences between public opinion and 
statutory sentencing schemes). 
 49 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 36–38, 40–48. 
 50 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1314. 
 51 See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 1, at 26–27, 133–44. 
 52 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1316, 1324. 
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citizens, are not bloodthirsty — they do not reflexively seek maximum 
sentences and their involvement does not lead to harsher sentences.53 
Instead of addressing the contrary empirical sources cited in my 
book, Lacey claims only that “research suggests that the desire for 
vengeance and punishment is insatiable, in the sense that while vic-
tims may believe that severe punishment of ‘their’ offender will make 
them feel more satisfied, that often turns out not to be the case.”54  The 
supposed “research” that she cites there, however, is a book chapter 
written by a philosopher.55  And it does not even support Lacey’s 
point, opposing her claim that blame can or should be sanitized of its 
negative emotions.56  At the very end, the cited chapter speculates that 
when retributive punishment does not deliver both “punitive payback” 
and educative, restorative dialogue, punishers will remain dissatisfied 
and call for ever-higher sentences.57  That fear dovetails with the in-
sider-outsider spiral I discuss in chapter II of my book.  And, rather 
than undercutting blame entirely, that concern supports my efforts to 
marry retributive and restorative justice. 
At bottom, Lacey objects not to excessive punishment but to retri-
bution generally.  As a result, she mistakenly views her goals as mutu-
ally exclusive of mine, failing to see how temporary blame and hard 
treatment promote reform and discharge a wrongdoer’s debt to society 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 91, 220 n.17.  For examples of such empirical evidence, see LESLIE 
SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 116–19 (1996) 
(summarizing various empirical studies concerning both victims and the public from a variety of 
countries, and suggesting that the public appears more punitive about wholesale policies than it 
does when confronting individual cases); Jan J.M. van Dijk, Crime and Victim Surveys, in IN-
TERNATIONAL VICTIMOLOGY 121, 121–22, 130 (Chris Sumner et al. eds., 1996) (“Criminolo-
gists have for years tried to redress the image of the victim as a person who seeks reassurance for 
his fears by demanding severe sentences.”), available at http://aic.gov.au/media_library 
/publications/proceedings/27/vandijk.pdf. 
 54 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1316. 
 55 Id. at 1316 n.42 (citing Victoria McGeer, Civilizing Blame, in BLAME 162, 187–88 & n.21 
(D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini eds., 2012)).  McGeer’s only support for her tentative sup-
position is a psychological study of university students who played a computer game against ma-
chine opponents, some of whom followed a cooperative strategy and some of whom behaved self-
ishly.  Many of the students later chose to punish the selfish players by spending less than a dollar 
to deprive the selfish players of up to a few dollars.  The students predicted that punishing would 
make them feel better, but ten minutes later they were more likely to be ruminating over the mat-
ter if they had personally inflicted revenge, though not if they had witnessed someone else impos-
ing punishment.  See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., The Paradoxical Consequences of Revenge, 95 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1316, 1318, 1320, 1322–23 (2008) (cited in McGeer, supra, at 
188 n.21).  A small-stakes, anonymous computer simulation involving university students over the 
course of ten minutes is hardly generalizable to criminal punishment, let alone to the spiral of in-
exorably higher punishment that Lacey predicts.  But even if it were, it would suggest that having 
the state impose retribution should not lead to dissatisfaction. 
 56 See McGeer, supra note 55, at 163–83. 
 57 Id. at 187. 
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and to his victim.58  She merges “doing justice” with “effective clinical 
treatment” pursuing “rehabilitative and related ends,” but opposes 
even temporary “affective blame,” “hard treatment[,] and stigma.”59  
She favors “responsibility without blame” and even suggests that pun-
ishment can occasionally be serious and appropriate without being 
negative at all.60  How is that punishment or justice?  Even one of  
Lacey’s own sources recognizes that it is artificial and impossible in 
practice to separate blame from “anger, resentment, [and] indignation,” 
as Lacey does.61  Criminal justice must blame and punish crimes, at 
least temporarily, to denounce wrongs, vindicate victims, and make 
wrongdoers pay their debts to society and victims.  Denouncing and 
punishing crimes are preconditions to reforming wrongdoers.  If we 
balk at punishing a moderately serious crime, the criminal verdict’s 
lesson is merely cheap talk.  And in our responsive political economy, 
voters will not stand for that but will further rebel, making matters 
worse. 
Consider a recent illustration, albeit from a different democracy: In 
India, a young woman was recently gang-raped and murdered by a 
group of drunken men.  Citizens began protesting the plague of sexual 
violence and harassment of women that the government has done little 
to combat.  Rather than embracing the protests and promising justice 
as well as reforms to combat future violence, the government seemed 
indifferent and tried to suppress the protesters, which only inflamed 
protesters’ rage.62  On Lacey’s logic, the protesters’ calls for retribu-
tion are merely window dressing for angry vengeance; they threaten 
equality and interfere with criminal justice professionals’ freedom to 
exercise their enlightened expertise in deciding to continue with busi-
ness as usual.  The gang-rapist-murderers should be treated clinically 
and therapeutically with a minimum of blame or anger.  On my view, 
the protesters’ demands to denounce the wrong, punish the wrongdo-
ers, and vindicate this and other victims are legitimate calls for justice.  
If the local officials had heeded the citizens instead of shutting them 
out, they could have fostered a public, democratic conversation about 
protecting women and sent a strong message condemning sexual vio-
lence. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 97–98. 
 59 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1317–18. 
 60 Id. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 Compare id. at 1316–17 (suggesting that we should separate “blameworthiness” from “affec-
tive blame” linked to “negative attitudes and emotions such as anger, hatred, and disgust, that are 
typical human responses to criminal or immoral conduct”), with McGeer, supra note 55, at 170 
(recognizing “the conceptual point that blame would not be blame absent the characteristic pres-
ence (and effect) of certain core emotions: anger, indignation, and resentment”). 
 62 See Jim Yardley, Shaky Response of India’s Government in Fatal Rape Case Magnifies Out-
rage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A6. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
On one final issue Lacey has a point.  As I acknowledge, America 
long ago ceased to be a nation of tightly knit colonial villages, homo-
geneous in race, ethnicity, religion, and moral values.63  Americans do 
still agree, to a surprising extent, on what fair procedures and substan-
tive criminal law and punishment should look like.64  But, as she 
notes, many Americans no longer live in small towns, and modern cit-
ies and suburbs are more anonymous and impersonal.  Thus, shame 
and informal sanctions are less powerful than they once were, and citi-
zens agree less on criminal justice issues, especially on victimless and 
morals offenses.65 
That is not, however, a reason to discard the historical ideals of lo-
cal deliberation and community self-government.  Instead, the current 
American landscape challenges us to build consensus at the neighbor-
hood or local level and to narrow criminal enforcement to those poli-
cies that can command broad support.  Interactions both in person (in 
community policing, community prosecution, and the like) and online 
(through social networking, discussion boards, and chat rooms) may 
perhaps re-create more community in the modern era.  In that regard, 
my book’s vision is somewhat idealistic.  But it prompts us to think 
hard about how to translate democratic self-government into practice, 
instead of complacently accepting the failed criminal justice machine. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 130, 162. 
 64 Id. at 119–20. 
 65 Lacey, supra note 1, at 1322–23, 1324. 
